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Abstract 
 
 
The analysis of the offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done 
separately. In the empirical literature these two variables are often considered independently 
although they may have endogenous relation in a contractual setting. Using a sample of 
European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set 
up in a contractual approach. The relationship of the percentage of cash with the offer 
premium is positive: higher premiums will yield payments with more cash.  
 
We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share 
payment. The existence of two regimes of payment in M&A transactions is the first 
conclusion we draw. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer 
premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of asymmetry of 
information and risk sharing calculus is found significant in the setting of the agreement.  
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Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: Empirical test of 
contractual setting in M&A transactions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The empirical literature privileges largely the acquirer’s point of view: Why does he take the 
decision to bid for a target? How does he set his offered price? However, according Faccio 
and Masulis (2005), « In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our 
focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the 
final terms of an M&A deal. » We will follow the latter’s intuition by analyzing a (successful) 
takeover as a contractual agreement where both parties find enough interest to lead the offer 
to a success. The two key variables defining a contract are the takeover premium, and the 
offered means of payment. The basis of a contractual approach is that these key variables are 
jointly determined and agreed as a package. We will not follow the track of numerous 
empirical studies that looks individually at premiums or means of payment because such an 
approach is incomplete. 
 
A M&A is an economic project per se that bears some economic risk either for the target’s 
shareholder or for the acquirer’s shareholders. This new risk can be dealt with ex ante, at the 
contract setting using an appropriate choice of means of payment. Cash payment, i.e. 
receiving liquidity, is a way for the seller to avoid risk. For the same, shares payment is a way 
to bear some of the new risk introduced by the project. The M&A project and the means of 
payment are linked together as part of the same global setting agreed between the seller and 
the buyer. The means of payment decision is a part of the contract, which is as important as 
the price itself. In a risk sharing perspective, the means of payment are ex ante choice to share 
the expected risk (and profit) from the transaction. This should be particularly true in mixed 
payment schemes where the relative percentage between shares and cash payment is an 
equilibrium variable. In these contexts, the package of mixed payment percentage and 
takeover premium will define the contract, and both will refer to asymmetry of information. 
The link between these two variables has not been extensively analyzed in the empirical 
literature.  
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This paper tests the hypothesis of a global contractual setting linking the takeover offer 
premium and the means of payment. Empirical studies have often privileged the analysis of 
either the takeover premiums, or the means of payment. A joint empirical analysis is 
developed with regard to a sample of 528 EU deals using systems of simultaneous equations. 
We show that offer premiums and means of payment interfere. We consider completed deals 
in the empirics of this paper. For a deal to succeed, it needs to satisfy both the bidder and the 
seller. Our findings support the view of M&A deals as global contractual equilibrium.   
 
The development will be divided into three parts. Section 1 proposes a review of the 
literature. Section 2 will present the sample and the variables. The empirical results are 
analyzed in the third section. A conclusion follows. 
 
1.1 Review of Literature 
 
The takeover premium and the mix of payment have often been considered in separate strands 
of the literature. 
 
1.1 Takeover premium 
 
Takeover premium have been extensively studies in the empirical corporate finance literature 
in relation to ownership structure or to acquirer’s or target’s characteristics. 
 
-) Ownership 
Takeover premium level is linked with the ownership structure of the target. The high 
bargaining power of large blockholder may force acquirers to higher bids (Stulz, 1988). The 
use of controlling devices such as double voting rights, separation of votes and cash flow 
rights may enhance that positive relationship. The existence of shareholders agreement is also 
viewed as an efficient mechanism of coordination inside the controlling group. It leads to 
higher firm valuation (Volpin, 2002; Belot, 2010), and it results in higher takeover premiums. 
Either the existence of an agreement between blockholders or the aggregate voting rights of 
the controlling party influences positively the takeover premium for French firms (Belot, 
2010). However premiums are also the consequence of private benefits paid to the inside 
owners or to incumbent blockholders. The latter trade their benefits against a higher premium, 
otherwise the incumbent shareholder will not accept to loose their control and /or their private 
 4
benefits. Bebchuk (1994), Burkard et al. (2000) or Burkart and Panunzi, (2004) support 
theoretically this view. Empirically, Moeller (2005) gives support to it. 
 
Deal characteristics also are important. The contestability of the offer is an element leading to 
higher prices (Stulz et al., 1990; Song and Walking, 1993). The empirical literature 
documents a positive relation between the target cumulative abnormal returns and the 
competitive nature of the bid. 
 
-) Firms’ characteristics 
When the target and the acquirer belong to the same economic sector, merging may yield 
economies of scale and higher profitability. The consistency of the project is measured by 
proximity or identity of the SIC codes of the buyer and the seller. Synergy gains will motivate 
higher bids by the bidder (Sundarsanam et al. 1996, Officer 2003). If the acquirer has already 
a stake of the target’s capital, it will give him a possible access to inside information. The 
toehold is defined by the percentage of shares owned by the bidder; it will explain a lower 
asymmetry of information. Betton and Eckbo (2000) showed that a toehold influences 
negatively the takeover premium. 
 
On the target’s characteristics side, size is a traditional control variable. The premium is 
spread over a larger investment. In line with Officer (2003), the relationship between size and 
premium is expected to be negative. The financial leverage of the target is also important 
because it may signal a monitoring of the target firm by debtors. This is particularly true for 
controlled companies or family firms. It will limit private benefits and then explain lower 
premiums. On the other hand, higher debt leverage may be used as a power enhancing tool for 
the controlling group and consequently may help appropriating private benefits. Stulz (1988) 
mentions that target’s entrenched controller may force a bidder to pay a higher premium. So 
the sign of the relationship is not defined.  
 
The process of takeover develops in a context of a double information asymmetry between the 
acquiring and target firms. Hansen (1987) was the first to mention the so-called “double 
lemons effect”, where each one has private information on his own value and has incomplete 
information on the nature of the assets he receives. The bidder buys assets of uncertain value. 
Being risk averse, he is willing to pay less when facing an information risk. He may also want 
to share the valuation risk by paying with equity of the newly merged group. The target’s 
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shareholders will receive shares based on a new economic project based on forecasted profits 
and synergies. They may also insure themselves by receiving cash and avoiding share 
payment. Asymmetries of information will explain the risk-sharing attitudes of the buyer and 
the seller and consequently the choice of a mix of payment (see below). Hansen (1987) 
measures the double asymmetry of information using the relative size of the target compared 
with the size of the bidder. The risk-sharing explanation is developed by Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1990) who introduced the sharing of the synergy gains between the buyer and the 
target firm’s shareholders into the analysis. The seller’s appropriation of the synergy gains is 
linked to the difference in information between the two parties. Chang and Mais (1998) 
expanded the idea that an exchange of information can help to solve the problem of double 
information asymmetry. They introduced a prior holding in the target’s capital (“toehold”) as 
a means to reduce the buyer’s asymmetry of information. In such a situation the buyer has a 
better inside knowledge of the target, especially if he holds a large portion of capital 
(Goldman and Qian, 2004). Cheng et al. (2008) used a sample of US firms to compare 
asymmetry of information, bid premiums and means of payment. They show that means of 
payment and bid premiums are interdependent, with means of payment conditioning heavily 
the price paid in the deal for a given asymmetry of information between the two parties. This 
suggests that the two terms are linked in a contract design perspective. 
 
1.2 Means of payment 
 
The literature devoted to means of payment follows another strand. A payment by shares has 
no consequence on the cash situation of the firm because the acquirers issues new shares. 
However, it may have consequence in terms of (i) signal to the firm’s shareholders and (ii) 
wealth situation of the final shareholders because of the dilution of the perspectives in value 
creation. 
 
In a M&A decision, a bidder is facing a choice between using cash and stocks as deal 
payment consideration. This alternative choice has conflicting effects and follows different 
explanations. A first rationale ensues from the starting idea that the financing decision is 
separated from the investment decision. The M&A project is first selected and then the 
acquirer considers ways to optimally finance the possible deal. The constraints here are the 
limits of the financial leverage or of the shareholder control structure of the bidder. Generally 
bidders have limited cash and liquid assets, so cash offers require debt or equity financing. 
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The pecking order theory says that acquirers will first choose internal funds. These funds are 
available either as holdings or as internally generated cash flow. Initiators with cash 
availability will prefer cash payment (Martin, 1996). Partial or full payment in shares may 
express the existence of financial constraints (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, equity 
financed transactions may yield problems in keeping up control when shareholding is 
concentrated. As Faccio and Lang (2002) pointed out, this situation occurs frequently in the 
EU. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces a choice of debt or equity financing, which 
involves a trade-off with corporate control concerns. Faccio and Masulis (2005) explain 
mixed payment in takeover by the structure of control and by the debt level of the acquiring 
firms. Their empirical tests on European mergers and acquisitions support the idea of a 
preference for a cash payment when there is a large shareholder owning 20% to 60% of the 
capital of the buyer. The bidder’s M&A currency decision is strongly influenced by his debt 
capacity and existing leverage. It can also be strongly influenced by entrenched managers or 
by the blockholder’s desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure.  
 
Payments in cash, either full-cash or mixed cash payments, need to be financed. The literature 
analyzes classically means of payment without questioning the source of funding the M&A 
transaction at the acquirer’s level. The acquirer may issue and sell new equity stocks, or issue 
debt, or use the firm’s cash holdings. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) analyzed the 
financing decision behind the choice of the means of payment in M&A transactions. 
Externally financed M&A are funded by 30% by equity and 70% by using debt. In a sample 
of Europeans deals they show that the financing decision and the choice of means of payment 
are driven by distinct determinants and are not interdependent. However, there show a 
significant evidence of an indirect and reverse influence of the means of payment on the 
internal/external financing choice. There is also an influence of the bidder’s choice to share or 
not the risk of the transaction with the target’s shareholders and/or to buy out these 
shareholders. In such a situation, equity payment and equity financing are privileged.  
 
The means of payment choice is also sensible to the genuine context of the deal. Strategic 
competition between bidders is the first reason given to prefer cash. Fishman (1989) analyzes 
the strategic role of the means of payment in public takeover and considers that a pure cash 
offer is dissuasive and signals good quality target firms. However, his model leads to cash-
only or share-only payments. Fishman relates the payment by cash to the future profitability 
of the target as expected by the competing bidders. Cornu and Isakov (2000) develop a model 
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in a context of a competitive offer between two acquiring firms. The risk, when the first one 
sets a price offer and a means of payment, is to trigger a counter-offer by the other firm. In 
order to disclose information on his strategy, the first bidder can use a signal through an 
announcement of a pure cash payment or a pure share payment. However, the large majority 
of mergers and acquisitions are non-hostile and the means of payment are diversified. The 
characteristics of the payment scheme have to be analyzed in a context of a known success of 
the takeover 
 
The portion of capital the bidder wants to receive (beyond gaining control) is an adjustment 
variable. That fraction reveals private information about the buyer’s real value. If the means 
of payment disclose private signals to other parties, it will in return also influence the process 
of negotiation. Hansen’s model explains the probability of paying in cash or in shares but 
does not focus on mixed-payment schemes. Double asymmetry of information may explain 
risk sharing choices and payment with shares issued by the initiator. Eckbo, Giammarino and 
Heinkel (1990) refer explicitly to the idea of an optimal mixed cash-shares payment. They 
were the first to highlight that the weighting between these two means of payment will reveal 
to other parties the respective quality of competitive buyers. Martin (1996) links the cash 
payment with private information: an acquirer with good growth opportunities will prefer a 
shares payment. 
 
The empirical literature on means of payment identifies the existence of different rationale 
explaining the cash or the equity choice (Carleton et al., 1983). The cash paid acquisitions are 
found to have better performances after (Linn et al. 2001). The literature on mixed cash-
equity payments is relatively recent. On a factual ground, mixed payment schemes have 
become increasingly important in mergers and acquisitions, particularly when considering 
offers for large firms. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) analyzed public takeover bids in 
Europe during the 1990s. Looking at a sample of 156 offers, 93 were pure cash, 37 pure 
shares and 18 were mixed payment. Among the latter, the portion of cash accounted for 
45.9% of the total payment. Faccio and Masulis (2005) considered a larger sample of 3,667 
mergers or acquisitions of European firms at the end of the nineties. The number of mixed 
payment operations is only 11.3% (with an average proportion of 57% in cash and 43% in 
shares). The size of a mixed payment takeover bid was five times (1.1 billion USD) greater 
than the size of a standard pure cash offer (209 million USD). Mixed payment schemes 
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represent a far greater proportion of transactions as the value of transactions rises2. However, 
this discrepancy is largely explained by cross-border transactions, where a large number of 
small deals are paid in cash. Comparing average relative sizes of the target with the acquirer 
gives similar results between mixed (16%) and full-shares payments (18%). Cash payments 
seem more devoted to relatively small targets, with an average relative size of 8% for 
transactions dealt fully in cash. In recent years, the number of mixed-payment takeovers has 
been increasing. Martynova and Renneboog (2006) considered 1,721 European takeovers 
between 1993 and 2001 and discovered that 54% were all-cash, 25% were mixed and 20% 
were all-equity transactions. On average, the mixed payments comprised 47% of stocks and 
53% of cash. Ben-Amar and Andre (2009) examined 293 Canadian mergers and acquisitions 
over the period 1998-2002. The sample composition was 58% cash-only, 19% stocks-only 
and 22% mixed payments. However, the latter represented 32.3% of the total value of the 
transaction, pointing out that mixed payment takeovers occur particularly in the higher value 
transactions. For mixed-payment takeovers, the average percentage of cash was 49% but with 
a standard deviation of 50%, corresponding to huge differences within payment schemes. 
 
Cross border M&A are usually more paid in cash. This traditional setting is documented by 
Chevalier and Redor (2007). They show that geographical distance is a good proxy for 
cultural distance. It is also a source of asymmetry of information for transactions located in 
far countries. This explains why cross border acquisitions are per se more paid in cash. Their 
dependant variable is the percentage paid in cash for US acquiring firms and includes mixed 
payment. The target shareholders will prefer cash because shares from a foreign firm may be 
not easily traded. The quality of the assets of a far away company is more difficult to assess. 
The information asymmetry develops with distance as shown by Chevalier and Redor (2010). 
Conversely, tax system will favor equity payments. In European tax systems, the payment by 
cash is considered as sales and the shareholder will exhibit effective gains submitted to 
income tax. Share payments are exchange of assets and are not considered as taxable effective 
gains. The target’s shareholders can defer later tax liabilities by accepting stocks as payment.  
 
1.3 The contractual nature of a M&A transaction 
 
                                                 
2
 The high number of all-cash takeovers in their sample is partly explained by the number of cross-border 
takeovers with US bidding firms, which are used to propose full payment in cash.   
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The chosen means of payment may also reveal the specific characteristics of the transaction. 
An M&A is an economic project and a contractual agreement with a seller. When it occurs, it 
signals a joint agreement between parties. The target’s shareholders are not forced to sell 
(except in buyout transactions).  
 
The risk of asymmetry of information is (partially) solved in such a contractual setting, by the 
level of the premium and by the choice of means of payment. La Bruslerie (2010) showed that 
choices are not univocal but occur in a process conveying private information from one party 
to the other. Mix of payment and takeover premium interfere. If the risk on the target’s assets 
is important or if the acquirer is risk averse, he may prefer payment in shares. However if the 
perspectives of profit after the acquisition are large, the acquirer’s shareholder will privilege a 
payment in cash in order to keep all the profit. Equilibrium between risk and return explains 
the choice between means of payment, and a trade-off will develop with the acquisition 
premium. If a buyer is insured against future bad news through a payment by shares, he can 
offer a better price. This equilibrium may give “corner solutions”, i.e. either full cash or full 
share payments. But it may also lead to mixed payment were the percentage paid in cash is a 
relevant measure of information asymmetry. The same calculus is followed from an inverse 
point of view by the targets’ shareholders. They are exposed to an information risk on the 
future gains in synergy and on the expected profit of the newly merged company. If they are 
expecting high profit or if they are delivered optimistic information, they will prefer share 
payment (for a given price paid). Except for corner solution where other determinants fully 
explains all–cash or all-shares payments, the percentage of cash in mixed payment schemes is 
part of the deal and defines the equilibrium concurrently with the agreed price.  
 
In a model, La Bruslerie (2010) shows that, from the buyer’s point of view, (i) correlated 
activities and economic risk between the target and the acquiring firms will result in a larger 
payment with cash; (ii) a trade-off develops between the percentage in cash and the premium 
paid in the acquisition. For the acquirer, the cash payment portion increases with the 
perspectives of profit due to synergy gains. The seller will accept a negative trade-off between 
a higher (lower) cash payment and a lower (higher) transaction price (i.e., a lower/higher 
portion of the expected acquisition gain). It is shown that mixed payment will only develop 
between “corner solutions” of full cash or full share payments, where the expected profit from 
the acquisition is between two limits. 
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The regulatory environment may also play a significant role in the contract setting. Some 
countries developed investor protection regulations which facilitate M&A transactions. In the 
European Union, a regulation is effective and gives strength to the protection of shareholders. 
It enforces an equal treatment principle between shareholders. The EU 13th directive was 
formally adopted in 2000 and implemented in the European countries, although with some 
local difference. Any takeover bid or private acquisition should be analyzed by the EU 
administration and comply with anti monopoly rules. European financial regulation is made at 
the global level and tries to set up “a unique global financial market”. The accounting policy 
in Europe should also comply with common rules. As an example, the introduction of the new 
common IFRS rules was enforced in 2005. Legal rules and procedures are taken at the 
countries level but must conform to the EU “directives”. The introduction in the domestic law 
system of each country may also explain differences. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998) highlight the importance of the legal system. However the legal code 
indicators, flagging Scandinavian, French, Anglo-Saxon or German origins, are found 
insignificant by Faccio and Masulis. We will thereafter limit the influence of regulatory 
environment by looking only to M&A transaction targeted at firms located in the 7 major 
European countries (i.e. UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium). We will 
disregard the recent European becoming countries (such as Eastern Europe countries) or tax-
heaven countries (Luxembourg). The sample is then homogeneous with regard to the 
regulation context.  
 
2 Data and variables 
 
2.1 Data 
 
The sample of European takeover was built from the Thomson One Banker date base. The 
period was limited to transactions between 01/01/2000 and 01/05/2010. A filter was used to 
focus on meaningful operations and  a minimum value of 50 million USD is required. Only 
completed deals were considered.3 Target companies are limited to firms belonging to the 
seven EU major countries: France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, 
and Italy. We select deals where the type of assets targeted by the acquirer is stock or 
                                                 
3
 The question of a bias in selecting our sample does not arise. We only consider as object of study are the agreed 
deals, i.e. deals were an agreement is found between the acquirer and the target. Not agreed deals are not 
completed. The ir analysis of their key variables and provisions is not relevant in a contract setting approach 
where an agreement reveals an economic equilibrium between the parties  
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equivalent stocks (i.e. assets giving rights to stocks). The means of payment referred at are 
only cash or stock (see Annex 1).  
 
We excluded offers coming from non developed countries, restricting to North American, 
European, or Japanese buyers. If the acquirer proposes his stocks as a valuable mean of 
payment, it requests that a large transparent and market exists for his stock to be accepted. 
This is why we restricted both targets and acquirers to be public firms. A sample of 528 
transactions is followed. We checked the used mode of payment through the data. A lot of 
deals are qualified “cash only” or “stock only” in the data base. Mixed payment transactions 
have also been screened. Those qualified as “hybrid” show a payment scheme with a 
percentage of cash and stocks. We only consider “pure” mixed payment with a percentage of 
cash and a percentage of stock summing up to one. Some deals are qualified as “unknown”. 
By looking at each operation syllabus we can allocated a lot of them to mix payment schemes. 
Deals with earn out payment considerations are excluded because of this uncertainty and 
complex features. Some transactions may involve payment in debt (particularly in the UK). 
This possibility is proposed alternatively with a cash payment. When analyzing deals with a 
debt payment, they generally appear to be equivalent to cash payment. So “cash payments” in 
the paper are defined as in Faccio and Masulis (2005) and includes cash, non-contingent 
liabilities and newly issued notes. We incorporate in the sample a lot of hybrid 
cash/debt/stock payment and recalculate the percentage of cash and shares summing up to 
one. 
 
The Faccio and Masulis sample considered deals from European bidder directed to any 
country in the world. It gives a large weight to UK firm deals (65% of the sample). We look at 
M&A targeted at European firms from major developed countries. Similarly to Faccio and 
Masulis, our sample is mainly intra EU: in their sample 77% of the bids come from European 
countries, 79% in our sample. 
 
Some deals were not documented without any price, or were initiated by Russian entities, or 
were squeeze out transactions (2 deals).4 They were not considered. So we are left with 504 
transactions. The analysis of the sample leads to identify some transactions that are buyback 
                                                 
4
 We eliminated also buyout deals from the analysis. They are not transaction between shareholders of two 
different and independent firms. They are decisions made by managers on behalf of the controlling shareholders 
to buy the shares of the firm. It does not involve another party. 
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programs launched by the company’s board. Here the target’s shares are the company’s stocks 
or a subsidiary’s. In these situations we do not have independent targets and acquirers. The 
buybacks were deleted (72 transactions). The remaining core of our sample is 432 
transactions of which 294 full cash payment, 62 mixed cash-share (called “hybrid”) and 76 
full share payments. The global value of theses deals is 898 billions USD. Some big 
acquisitions will explain this amount: the biggest transaction is the Bencham/Glaxo 
acquisition and has a transaction value of 76 billions USD. The smallest operation shows a 
transaction value of 50.2 millions USD. 
 
2.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
When considering the 3 sub samples of full cash, full share and hybrid (i.e. mixed cash-share) 
payments, we point out differences in the average deal size (see Table 1). As in Faccio and 
Masulis, we find that cash deals are the most numerous but also have a relatively small size. 
Hybrid transactions are 3 times larger than cash paid deals (five times in the Faccio and 
Masulis’ sample). Full share payments are important deals. The cumulated values of the deals 
paid fully either in cash or in stock, are equivalent (i.e. around 40% of the grand total each). 
The mixed payment transactions are not negligible; they represented a cumulated value of 211 
billions USD and 24% of the total sample. A test of difference in size show that shares and 
hybrid transactions are not different (p=0.34), but the sizes between full cash and hybrid 
transactions, on one hand, and full cash and full share transactions, on the other hand, are 
different at the 5% level (both p=0.03). 
 
 Number  Total value  Av. deal size 
Cash 294 68.1% 365192 40.7% 1242.15 
Hybrid 62 14.4% 211775 23.6% 3415.72 
Shares 76 17.6% 321091 35.8% 4224.89 
Total 432  898058   
Table 1 Number and value of European M&A 2000-2010 
(Sample of 432 transactions after exclusion of squeeze out and buyback programs of the 
original sample of 528 deals, 2000-2010, see annex1; values in million USD; source Thomson 
One Banker) 
 
An important number of deals were private deals. Direct negotiation between the two parties 
converged and a block sale occurred. A total of 66 private transactions were identified, often 
linked to going private operations. All these private acquisition are “cash only” deals.  
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The sample of targets firms shows a large number of deals targeted at British firms (43%). 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) noticed the same dominance of British firms in their 
sample. The transactions initiated by acquirers located in the EU represent 79% of the sample 
(see Table 2). Cross border deals (21% of the total) will refer to outside EU acquirers. Table 3 
analyzes the origin country of the target by means of payment. We introduce a distinction 
between cross border acquirers coming from the USA and acquirers coming from the rest of 
the world. We see that pure intra country deals are more often paid full share than full cash. 
Conversely, non US acquirer entering into a cross border acquisition will pay 9 times out of 
10 fully in cash. However looking at initiators coming from other EU countries or from the 
USA, they have similar proportions of mean of payment. For instance, we cannot say that US 
acquirers will systematically pay in cash. They use full cash payment only 3 times out of 4. 
 
Target Country Number % 
Italy 18 4.17% 
France 69 15.97% 
UK 186 43.06% 
Netherlands 46 10.65% 
Germany 48 11.11% 
Spain 52 12.04% 
Belgium 13 3.01% 
Total 432 100.00% 
(Intra EU acquirer) (340) (78.70%) 
Table 2 European M&A transactions by country of target firm 
(Sample of 432 transactions, period 2000-2010, target firms incorporated in Italy, France, the 
UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Belgium; Intra EU acquirer: Initiator incorporated 
in North America, Japan or other European countries; see Table 1) 
 
 Cash (%) Hybrid (%) Shares (%) Total (%) 
Intra European country 137 58.5% 43 18.4% 54 23.1% 234 54.2% 
Intra Europe Union 81 76.4% 8 7.5% 17 16.0% 106 24.5% 
Cross border US 
acquirer 
35 74.5% 7 14.9% 5 10.6% 47 10.9% 
Cross border non US 
acquirer 
41 91.1% 4 8.9% 0 0.0% 45 10.4% 
Total 294 68.1% 62 14.4% 76 17.6% 432 100.0% 
Table 3 Target country and means of payment 
(Number of transactions, sample of 432 European transactions, period 2000-2010, see Table 
2) 
 
We analyzed the industry sector of the acquirer and the target firm using the Thomson 
Financial mid code. A total of 219 deals (51%) are within industry M&As. 
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A deal is aimed at buying a large block of stocks, generally giving the initiator majority of the 
equity capital. However the aim to get a controlling block should at the end take into account 
the percentage of share previously owned by the bidder. A toehold block may explain why the 
percentage of shares sought is lower, although it gives a controlling position at the end of the 
deal. A first feature of M&A transactions is the percentage of shares acquired in the deal. It 
cumulates with the percentage of shares previously held to give the percentage of shares 
owned after the transaction. On average over the sample, the percentage of acquired shares is 
58%, the percentage sought in the deal is 63% and the percentage owned after the transaction 
is 73% of the capital. It means that significant toeholds exist representing on the average 15% 
of the capital. It is explained by the subsidiary feature of many target firms. A total of 101 
targets are subsidiary (19% of the total sample). Among the subsidiary targets sub sample, the 
toehold percentage is on average 45.6% (median 54.6%) of the capital. The non subsidiary 
firms have an average toehold of 8.5%. 
 
In a contractual approach a deal is an agreement set on a quantity and a price. Looking at 
firm’s acquisition, the quantity side is the percentage of shares of the target acquired in the 
transaction. It cumulates with shares previously held by the bidder. Looking at means of 
payment, the percentage of shares acquired in the deal is similar using hybrid or share 
payments considerations. Cash payments exhibit lower acquired percentage and lower owned 
percentage after the deal. This is explained mainly by private block acquisition where the 
average bought block represents 22% of the capital. However, in that situation, the toehold is 
more important and shows a significant previous investment in the target’s capital (around 
23%). The cash payment in public takeover is targeted at larger acquisition of capital (average 
of 65%). As a result we see that the aim of M&A transactions is control because the final 
owned percentage is largely around 80 to 90% of the capital of the target firm. We separate in 
the cash deals those following a private acquisition mechanism and those following a public 
takeover bid procedure. Private deals seem to follow a rationale of control building process. 
The acquirer of a block takes advantage of an opportunity given by a seller even if the size of 
the block in itself does not give him an immediate control of the target. Many blocks are small 
block acquisitions (with median private acquisition of 16% of the target’s capital). In the case 
of private deals, cumulating with previous ownership results in a final blockholding of 45% of 
the capital. It implies a controlling position. 
 
 Cash (of which (of which Hybrid  Shares 
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private) public) 
% acq'd in the deal 
(mean) 
56.08 22.20 64.90 85.66 77.74 
% acq'd in the deal 
(median) 
49.97 15.53 82.58 100.00 100.00 
% owned after (mean) 75.18 45.15 82.89 94.28 90.79 
% owned after (median) 99.26 28.55 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Toehold (%) 19.10 22.95 17.99 8.63 13.05 
Table 4 Percentage of target’s capital acquired in the deal and held after 
(Sample of 432 European transactions; 2000-2010) 
 
The average data in table 4 will cover very different situations particularly for cash payments 
where the median is lower than the mean. M&A transactions are joint contractual agreements 
between the bidder and the shareholders of the target firm, which are characterized (among 
other variables) by the percentage of acquired shares. If the means of payment have no 
significant influence on the contract setting, we will get similarly distributed variables in table 
4 and no significant differences in the percentage of acquired or owned capital. A t-test of 
average is run to check if the difference in percentages of capital acquired or owned is 
significant according the mean of payment. Table 5 puts into evidence different rationales. 
The percentages of capital got through different means of payment are significantly different. 
The nature of the deal is different if we consider cash payment in private or public transaction. 
Cash payment involves percentages of capital of the target firm significantly larger than the 
other means of payment. The unidimensional test shows that the choice of mean of payment 
interferes with one of the main terms of the contractual setting. For rational players it is a 
significant variable that influence the agreements. However, in any situation, the averages are 
not different when considering hybrid and full share payments. If we look at the targeted 
share of capital, there is no difference in the nature of the deal between hybrid and share 
payments. 
 
Means of payment % acq'd in the deal % owned after 
Cash vs. share deals  0.00 0.00 
Cash/private deals vs. 
Cash/public deals 
0.00 0.00 
Cash/public vs. hybrid deals 0.00 0.00 
Cash vs. hybrid deals 0.00 0.00 
Hybrid vs. share deals 0.14 0.32 
Table 5 Test of difference between the percentage of acquired and held capital after the 
transaction 
(t-test, p-values, see Table 4;) 
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Looking at hybrid payments, the average percentage paid in cash is 47%. The distribution of 
the percentage of cash is large. For instance 25% of the mixed payment deals have a cash part 
lower than 30% of the transaction value (see table 6).  
 
  Average Median 1st Quart. 3rd Quart N 
% paid in cash 47,19 49,14 29,97 66,09 58 
Table 6 Percentage paid in cash in mixed payment transactions 
(Sample of 432 European M&A transactions) 
 
The offer premium in percentage is another term of the transaction. On average the premium 
is between 17 and 28% of the target’s share price 1 day before announcement. Looking at the 
means of payment, average paid premiums seem to be similar. Particularly, average full cash 
and hybrid premiums are very close. A t-test confirms the rejection of the idea of different 
premiums according to hybrid or full cash payments. However these results are not strong 
comparing shares payment premiums between with the others. Share payment premiums are 
different and significantly lower only at the 10% level. 
 
Offer premium Cash Hybrid Shares 
Average 25.53 27.80 17.29 
Median 17.28 21.99 12.45 
1st quart 6.95 10.40 4.37 
3rd quart 38.74 41.94 31.57 
N 217 49 55 
t-test cash vs. shares cash vs. hybrid hybrid vs. shares 
p-value 0.078 0.574 0.057 
Table 7 offer premium by mean of payment 
 
2.3 Variables 
 
The variables are described in Table 8. Most of them are taken from the Thomson One Banker 
data base. A lot of variables are calculated from the previous one.  
 
Variables names Description 
ACQ_CASH_HLDG Acquirer cash and receivables as of the previous financial report ($mil) 
ACQ_EBITDA Acquirer EBITDA at last financial report ($mil) 
ACQ_LEV Calculated using the ratio of ACQ_NET_DEBT divided by 
ACQ_NET_DEBT plus ACQ_NET_ASS 
ACQ_MKT_VAL_4W Acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks prior to announcement ($ mil) 
ACQ_NET_ASS Acquirer net assets : Total asset at last financial report minus total 
liabilities ($mil) 
ACQ_NET_DEBT Acquirer Net Debt: Calculated by adding the acquirer's straight debt, 
short-term debt, and preferred equity and subtracting cash and 
marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial 
information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). 
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ACQ_PC_CASH Acquirer ratio of cash holding (ACQ_CASH_HLDG) divided by 
transaction value, TRANS_VAL 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA Acquirer ratio of EBITDA (ACQ_EBITDA) divided by transaction 
value, TRANS_VAL 
ACQ_PC_PPE Ratio of acquirer’s ACQ_NET_DEBT compared to ACQ_PPE 
ACQ_PPE Acquirer property, plant, equipments at LTM ($mil) 
ACQ_Q ACQ_MKT_VAL_4W divided by ACQ_NET_ASS 
ASYMMETRY1 Ratio of relative net assets: TARG_NET_ASS divided by 
ACQ_NET_ASS 
ASYMMETRY2 Ratio of target market value TARG_MKT_VAL divided by acquirer 
market value 4 week prior ACQ_MKT_VAL_4W 
ASYMMETRY3 Ratio of transaction value of the target compared with the accounting 
value acquirer: TRANS_VAL divided by 
(ACQ_NET_ASS+ACQ_NET_DEBT) 
ASYMMETRY4 Ratio of the target’Q and the acquirer’s Q: TARG_Q/ACQ_Q 
DESEQ Disequilibrium in the transaction setting: difference between the 
percentage of shares sought by the acquirer and the percentage of shares 
acquired. 
DOMESTIC_ACQ Dummy if the target and the acquirer are incorporated in the same 
country 
DUM_CASH Dummy for full cash payment 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEAL Dummy challenged deal where a third party launched an offer 
DUM_EU_ZONE Dummy if acquirer is incorporated in the EU (limited to 7 contries) 
DUM_HYBRID Dummy for mixed cash-share payment transaction 
DUM_SH Dummy for full share payment 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY Dummy is target is a subsidiary 
DUM_TARG_FAM_OWN Target is family owned/controlled at the 20% level. This dummy is 
indicated also if a chairman owns a substantial stake (defined as 20%). 
DUM_TOE Dummy for toehold shares of the target held before the transaction. See 
TOEHOLD. 
EBIT_ROA Target EBIT divided by Total Assets for the last 12 months ending on the 
date of the most current financial information 
ENT_VAL Enterprise Value of the target calculated by multiplying the number of 
actual target shares outstanding (from the most recent balance sheet 
released prior to the announcement) by the offer price and then by adding 
the cost to acquire convertible securities, plus short-term debt, straight 
debt, and preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities, stated in 
millions. This data item is for the enterprise value of 100% of the 
company based on the offering price, regardless of how much was 
actually acquired in the transaction. 
EQ_VAL Equity Value of the target calculated by multiplying the actual number of 
target shares outstanding from its most recent balance sheet by the offer 
price per share plus the cost to acquire convertible securities, stated in 
millions. This data item is for the equity value of 100% of the company 
based on the offering price. 
FRIEN_ATTITUD Attitude of the board of the target company (0: not friendly, 1:yes) 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Same as previous but 1 week prior 
PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU Percentage of acquirer’s shares issued: Number of common shares issued 
in the transaction divided by total number of acquirer’s shares. 
PERC_CASH Percentage of cash and assimilated (debt) paid in the transaction 
PERC_OWN_AFTER Percentage of shares own after transaction 
PERC_SEEKING_TO_OWN Percentage of shares acquirer is seeking to own after the transaction. It 
includes shares held before. 
PERC_SH Percentage of the transaction paid by issued shares of the acquirer 
PERC_SH_ACQ Percentage of shares acquired in transaction 
PERC_SOUGHT Percentage of shares sought by acquirer in the transaction 
SAME_SECTOR Dummy for same industry codes between target and acquirer. Thomson 
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mid sector codes are used. 
TARG_LEV Ratio of 1 minus EQ_VAL divided by ENT_VAL. 
TARG_LEV1 Target long term debt divided by total capitalization as of the date of the 
most current financial information. Total capitalization is long term debt 
plus equity. 
TARG_MKT_VAL Target Market Value: Calculated by multiplying the total number of 
target shares outstanding times the target stock price 4 weeks prior to 
announcement date ($mil) 
TARG_NET_ASS Target Net Assets: Total assets minus total liabilities on the date of most 
recent financial information ($mil) 
TARG_PC_CASH Ratio of target cash and receivables (TRAG_CASH_HLDG) divided by 
transaction value, TRANS_VAL. 
TARG_Q Ratio of Enterprise Value to Target Capitalization: Enterprise value is 
calculated by multiplying the number of actual target shares outstanding 
by the offer price and then by adding the cost to acquire convertible 
securities, plus short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus 
cash and marketable securities. Capitalization is defined at Short-Term 
Debt + Long-Term Debt + Shareholder’s Equity as of the date of the 
most current financial information prior to the announcement. 
TARG_Q1 Ratio of Enterprise Value to Net Assets: Enterprise value divided by 
target net assets as of the date of the most current financial information. 
The enterprise value of a transaction is calculated by multiplying the 
number of target actual shares outstanding from its most recent balance 
sheet by the offer price and then by adding the cost to acquire convertible 
securities, plus short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus 
cash and marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial 
information 
TOEHOLD Percentage of share of the target held before the transaction. Calculated 
using the difference between  PERC_OWN_AFTER minus 
PERC_SH_ACQD 
TRANS_VAL Value of Transaction ($ mil): Total value of consideration paid by the 
acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. 
Table 8 (LTM: Last Twelve Months: financial information is taken from the last reports prior 
the announcement; source: Thomson and after treatments) 
 
The variables considered to determine the contractual setting of M&As are those mentioned in 
the literature. 
 
Financing conditions of the acquirer is a first explanation of the choice of means of payment 
and of the paid price. Cash capacity of the acquirer is identified with ACQ_PC_CASH and 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA. Raising debt is also a substitute to internal cash payment: It depends on 
the debt capacity of the acquiring firm. Two variables can be used to proxy it: The collateral 
value of his assets is ACQ_PC_PPE; it is expressed as the ratio of net debt compared to the 
acquirer’s plant, property and equipment. A low value shows an important debt capacity 
based on fixed assets. The other variable is the acquirer’s financial debt leverage ACQ_LEV. 
The idea here is simply that highly leveraged firms are more likely to choose equity financing. 
These variables are drawn from the financial report at the end of the year prior to the deal. 
Target leverage is also an element that can influence the acquirer capacity to finance the deal. 
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In a situation of success, a low leveraged subsidiary with a good debt capacity will help the 
initiator to finance the deal using debt and cash. TARG_LEV is a variable which measure the 
target financial leverage. It is set as the ratio of the equity value of the target valued (using the 
offer price) divided by the total enterprise value of the target (with equity also taken at the 
offer price) minus one. This leverage is market valued. We also use TARG_LEV1 which is 
book valued. The cash situation of the target is also an element which is of interest because a 
buyer cans self pay an acquisition. We used the variable TARG_PC_CASH. A good cash-
flow from the target is also an element which helps to repay debt issued by the initiator when 
implementing the transaction. We considered the EBIT_ROA ratio  
 
The target Tobin’s Q may be proxied by the ratio of his equity valued at the offer price 
compared with the book value of equity at the last financial report named TARG_Q in table 8. 
Another proxy (labeled TARG_Q1) measures the acquirer Tobin’s Q using the ratio of his 
market value four weeks before the transaction divide by his equity net asset amount taken 
from the mast financial report (ACQ_Q). The Q values measure the growth opportunities of 
the buyer and of the seller. It also proxies a possible market overvaluation of the acquirer’s 
stock value.  
 
The PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSUED variable is used as a proxy for assessing a risk on the control 
situation of the acquirer. As in Faccio and Masulis (2005), this variable is set using a 20% 
control threshold. The control situation of family firms is acknowledged using a dummy 
DUM_TARG_FAM_OWN. Another dummy takes into account the subsidiary feature of the 
target (DUM_SUBSIDIARY) 
 
The competitive nature of the takeover has been identified in the literature as a strong 
argument for cash payments. The idea is simple: cash is a signal of the will of the bidder to 
acquire a target and deter competition by other potential bidders (Fishman ,1989; Berkovitch 
and Narayanan, 1990; Cornu and Isakov, 2000) The competitive context can be measured by 
a dummy variable (DUM_CHALLGD_DEAL). A dummy for friendly attitude of the target is 
also used (FRIEN_ATTITUD). 
 
We introduce a variable for toehold (which is set comparing the percentage of share own after 
the transaction and the percentage acquired through the transaction). The variable TOEHOLD 
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gives the percentage of share owned before. A dummy DUM_TOE is also used when toehold 
exists. Toeholds may limit asymmetry of information.  
 
The double asymmetry of information using the relative size of the target compared with the 
size of the bidder. A first measure of asymmetry following Hansen (1987) is the relative net 
asset values using book data (ASYMMETRY1). Another relative value is set comparing the 
transaction value spent in the transaction (TRANS_VAL) and the market value of the acquirer 
valued 4 weeks before (ASSYMMETRY2). The relative size is also measured comparing the 
total book assets (ASYMMETRY3). We may think that the Q value of each firm is also a 
proxy of some internal value that is not disclosed in the financial report. Each firm knows 
better his own growth potential. The relative size of it may be a measure of the internal 
private information discrepancy between the two (ASYMMETRY4). 
 
The deal characteristics are measured using the premium (OFFER_PREMIUM_1W) or the 
mean of payment either in the dummy form (DUM_CASH, DUM_SH, DUM_HYBRID) or in 
percentage (PERC_CASH). We introduce ex ante features of the deal: PERC_SOUGHT may 
help in comparing if the ex post result is in linked with ex ante goals of the initiator. It 
compares with PERC_SH_ACQUD after the deal. The DESEQ variable measures the 
imbalance from the acquirer’s point of view. The institutional context of the deal is 
acknowledged with a dummy for domestic acquisitions (DOMESTIC_ACQ) or a dummy for 
intra EU transactions (DUM_EU_ZONE flagging initiators that are incorporated in the EU). 
The TRANS_VAL value is in absolute size; it is used to see if the absolute amount of the 
transaction influences its outcome. The economic context of the deal and the purpose of 
business diversification is followed thought the dummy SAME_SECTOR. 
 
A filtering has been applied to the asymmetry, the leverage, and the Tobin’s Q variables. We 
eliminate the extreme values below the 1% and above the 99% of the cumulated distribution. 
We checked the correlation between the variables. Cross correlations between 
ASYMMETRY3 and TRANS_VAL, ACQ_PC_CASH and TARG_PC_CASH, 
ACQ_PC_CASH and ACQ_PC_EBITDA, PERC_SOUGHT and DUM_TOE, 
PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU and ASYMMETRY1, PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU and ASYMMETRY3, 
EBIT_ROA and ASYMMETRY4, TARGET_Q and ASYMMETRY4, ACQ_PC_CASH and 
TARG_LEV, TARG_Q and EBIT_ROA, PERC_ACQ and TOEHOLD are important (above 
0.30). So we disregard the redundant explaining variables. 
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The proxy of asymmetry of information shows that the bidder is relatively better informed 
than the target. However the relative Q ratio (ASYMMETRY4) is interesting in the sense that 
it is above 1. It should not be considered as a good measure in absolute terms because our 
measures of acquirer’s Q and target’s Q are not perfectly homogenous.  
 
The correlation matrix among information asymmetry measures (see Annex 2) shows that the 
variables ASYMMETRY1, ASYMMETRY2 and ASYMMETRY3 are highly correlated 
.ASYMMETRY 2 is populated with a limited number of observations. It is cross correlated 
with ASYMMETRY3 and ACQ_LEV. We will hereafter only consider either 
ASYMMETRY1 or ASYMMETR3. The two variables TAR_LEV and TARG_LEV1 are 
perfectly correlate and redundant. We choose TARG_LEV. The two TARG_Q and 
TARG_Q1 measures are also highly correlated. We choose the first. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variable are presented in Annex 1. The Tobin’s Q value of the 
target and the acquirer are similar (3.6 vs. 3.3). An average toehold of 14% for those firm 
holding shares (30% of the sample) is evidenced. The acquirer seeks a percentage of 61% of 
the target’s capital. He gets only 58%, so a 3% disequilibrium is evidenced. Due to previous 
toeholds, the percentage sought after the transaction is 76% but the acquirer ends the 
transaction with a cumulated stake of 73%. The average premium is between 25 to 30% 
depending if it is calculated 1 day or 4 weeks before. 
 
3 Empirical tests 
 
3.1 Methodology and hypotheses 
 
According Faccio and Masulis (2005), « Since we expect both bidder and target preferences 
to affect the offer price and its form of consideration, we would ideally like to simultaneously 
estimate equations capturing the two parties’ preferences. However, identification requires 
information about a target’s stand alone value relative to its purchase price (takeover 
premium) as well as the form of payment. Access to information about a target’s stand alone 
value is unavailable, given that most of these firms are privately held. This precludes 
estimating the alternative purchase prices conditional on form of payment. As a consequence, 
we have chosen to estimate a reduced form equation that includes both parties’ preferences as 
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explanatory variables. ». The test we implement considers the transaction characteristics as a 
whole. Cash payment and premiums are jointly set. We intend to set up a simultaneous 
equations model explaining the means of payment and the takeover premium. The same 
methodology was used by Officer (2003) to take into account the endogeneity between the 
premium and the existence of termination fee paid to the bidder. However in a first step we 
analyze separately the determinants of the payment decision and those of the premium.  
 
The variable conditioning the parameters setting of the contract are mentioned in table 9. We 
considered a limited sub-sample of variable after taking into account colinearities. The 
expected relationship of each one versus either the percentage of cash (covering the three 
situations of full share/mixed/full cash payments) or the premium paid is also mentioned. We 
introduce a distinction between the three main explicative theories: (i) the financing decision 
explanation, (ii) the asymmetry of information and contractual setting approach, and (iii) the 
conditioning by environmental characteristics of the deal. 
I 
Dependant variable  Perc cash   Premium  
Independent  Financial 
constraint 
Contractual 
& AI 
Environment Financial 
constraint 
Contractual 
& AI 
Environment 
PERC_SH_ACQD 
-      
TRANS_VAL 
-   -   
SAME_SECT 
 -     
DOMESTIC_ACQ 
  -   - 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA +      
TARG_PC_CASH +   +   
FRIEN_ATTITUD 
 - -   - 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W +  ns ns ns 
DUM_TOE 
 +   +  
EBIT_ROA +   +   
ACQ_LEV 
-      
TARG_LEV 
-      
ACQ_Q 
-   +   
TARG_Q 
 +/-   +  
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 
 +   + 
PERC_SOUGHT 
-      
DUM_SUBSIDIARY 
 +   +  
ASYMMETRY1 
 -   -  
DESEQ 
    -  
PER_ACQ_SH_ISSU 
  +    
PERC_CASH ns ns ns  +  
Table 9 - Expected sign between the percentages paid in cash and the offer premium and 
possible determinants 
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(According to three main theoretical approaches: Financial constraint and limitation theory, 
asymmetry of information and contract theory, environment and firm characteristics; AI: 
asymmetry of information) 
 
The percentage of cash in a financial constraint approach is positively linked with acquirer’s 
cash holding and Ebitda, and with the target’s margin. It is negatively linked with leverage, 
with the absolute size of the transaction and the percentage of acquired shares. The 
overvaluation hypothesis introduces a negative link when the acquirer wants to time the stock 
market to finance the transaction. The asymmetry of information introduces a risk sharing 
preference. The existence of a toehold will favor share payment in the mix. The toehold is a 
driver to access to better information and to reduce the asymmetry problem. The bidder will 
pay more in shares when he enjoys better information. This is not intuitive. Same results are 
got with the variables used as device to reduce the asymmetry of information. The existence 
of toehold or the subsidiary status of a target, are viewed as a device to reduce the asymmetry 
and the acquirer does not need to issue shares for risk-sharing purpose. Similarly, the 
relationship with the absence of economic diversification is negative. The premium is linked 
in the contractual setting with the means of payment. At equilibrium, for hybrid payments, the 
acquirer may be willing to pay a slightly higher premium (i.e. to abandon a higher part of the 
M&A creation of value to the seller) if he can seize a larger part of the future profits by 
paying by cash to avoid dilution. The target’s shareholders capture the actual value of future 
gains by accepting more immediate cash. The environmental features are known: cross border 
and challenged deals are more largely paid in cash. 
 
Looking at the premium, liquid and profitable firms can pay more. The same may be true if 
they have large Tobin’s Q to time the market and issue largely priced shares. The asymmetry 
of information approach says that asymmetry of information is a risk which is balanced by 
lower prices and premiums. Targets which are subsidiaries, or where toehold stakes held by 
the acquirer exist, are more transparent to the buyer and can be paid more. The same is true if 
the opportunity growths of the target are large. The percentage of cash has a trade-off 
relationship with the premium paid. The context of the deal will also influence the paid price 
with an increase if it is competitive or if it is a cross border deal. Similarly for characteristics 
of the firms: for instance when the size of the target is large, the bidder will pay more in 
shares.  
 
 24
The DESEQ variable takes into account a possibility that the final terms are not equilibrium 
terms from the buyer’s point of view. It is the difference between the percentage of shares 
sought in the deal and the percentage effectively bought. A positive discrepancy means that, 
to his opinion, he should have paid more to get a higher stake of capital. So we expect a 
negative sign.  
 
The acquirer’s Q ratio is a double face variable: it can signal an overvalued share value and a 
possibility to time the market by the bidder’s managers. But it may also signal good future 
perspectives of the firm (Martin, 1996). Former shareholders may not want to share growth 
opportunities with new blockholders. To avoid dilution of the former shareholder’s, the 
payment in shares to new shareholders is voluntarily limited. Financial constraints or 
limitation may explain equity payment and financing: this will occur when the percentage of 
share acquired is important, or when the size of the deal is important.  
 
.. 
3.2 Determinants of the payment decision  
 
The mean of payment decision may be analyzed as a continuum between 0 and 100% cash 
payment. This approach views the determinants as playing a continuous role to explain the 
cash percentage. Traditionally a linear model will imply that a significant given determinant 
explains at the same time a full cash, a full equity or a mixed payment. The hypothesis of a 
unique set of determinants over the scope of cash percentage payment is very strong and 
questionable. The alternative hypothesis is that there are possibly three different regimes of 
means of payment, each one explaining either the full-cash, or the full equity or the mixed 
equity payment. The idea of three regimes is based on the idea that the full-equity and the 
full-cash payments are « corner solutions » for a rational investor (La Bruslerie, 2010). Even a 
methodology of Tobit regression, as the one implemented by Faccio and Masulis (2005), 
relies one the hypothesis of a unique set of determinants. It only takes into account the fact 
that the dependant variable (i.e. the percentage of cash payment) is constrained. So the 
distribution of errors hypothesized in a simple Probit or Logit model may be not satisfied. 
However a Tobit model does not allow for the possibility of different rationales in choosing 
the means of payment.  
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In a first step we will consider globally the whole observations. The used of a Probit analysis 
to identify the variable influencing the decision of each mean of payment against the other 
two is not sound. Can we say that, when choosing a hybrid payment and rejecting full cash or 
full share payments, the acquirer is indifferent between the last two? We analyze pure 
alternative choices using a Probit analysis of a mean of payment against another one. With 
three means of payment, it gives three Probit analyses. Table 10 confirms that a larger offer 
premium increases the possibility of a hybrid or a cash payment. Asymmetry variable is not 
significant, but when the target is a subsidiary or when the acquirer has a toehold stake, the 
probability of a hybrid payment increases compared with a full share one. It means than the 
lower asymmetry of information linked with such a situation does not result in a risk sharing 
full share scheme. The presence of an important internal cash flow favors cash payment. The 
challenged deals are more frequently paid in cash. As Martynova and Renneboog (2009), we 
do not find a significant or consistent relationship between the bidder's financial condition 
(e.g. leverage) and the means of payment. A leveraged target makes the deal more frequently 
paid with shares or hybrid payments. The explanation here should be set in conjunction with 
the no relevance of acquirer’s debt leverage. The latter has a good financial structure before 
the deal, and the new financial structure of the group after the merger should not be hit by a 
larger debt linked with cash payment. This rationale impacts the deal when it implies merging 
with a relatively indebted target. So the acquisition of a leveraged target is more paid with 
shares to limit the side effect of the acquisition on the acquirer’s own leverage. This 
explanation goes along with dynamic debt capacity limitation which occasionally will stress 
the cash payment scheme. 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 
 
The acquirer’s Q is positively linked with share payment, what is in line with the stock 
overvaluation explanation. It does not support the idea of privately known growth 
opportunities at the acquirer’s level which would lead him to prefer cash payments (Martin, 
1996). The target’s Q ratio is significant against cash payment. Good opportunity growths at 
the target’s level may favor full or partial payment with shares. The target’s Q is significant 
and goes with the probability to have a full equity payment. This is in line with what was 
expected since the acquirer is facing an information risk about the opportunity growth of the 
target. A large part of the latter’s value is not linked with accounted assets in the balance 
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sheet. Therefore, a higher exposure to risky information on the off-balance sheet value may 
push the acquirer to cover that risk using share payment. 
 
-) Robustness checks over the whole sample 
 
We tried to use an ordered Logit model where the dependent variable equal 2 in full cash, 1 in 
hybrid, and 0 in full equity payment situations (as in Faccio and Masulis, 2005). We also tried 
to use a multinomial Logit test of the three cases in the spirit of Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009). However the structure of the data is not conclusive and no convergent results are 
obtained with the full set of explaining variables. A restricted ordered Logit model with 3 
ordinal dependant variable works well with 5 dependant variables plus a constant. Four out of 
five are significant. However this model introduces a unique model value and uses cuts to 
create three classes. A restricted multinomial Logit is also run. It tests jointly the difference 
between all-cash and hybrid payments and the difference between cash and all-share 
payments. The variables are not significant in the first alternative case but are with regard to 
the cash/share payment alternative. We still have a probability to choose cash payment 
increasing with the offer premium and the target leverage and a probability of choosing share 
payment increasing with the information asymmetry and the transaction absolute value (see 
table 11). This result illustrates that full cash and full share are opposite corner solutions 
(Carleton et al., 1983). At the same time the variable explaining the choice between cash and 
hybrid payments are not the same because none of the previous ones are significant. It 
supports the idea that hybrid payment choice follows a different rationale and is explained by 
other variables. The overall regime of payment choice is a pure alternative between these two 
schemes.  
 
Ordered Logit   Multinomial   
   
Cash vs. Hybrid 
 
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant 1,6488 0,0000a Constant -0,1998 0,7886 
TRANS_VAL 0,0000 0,0313b TRANS_VAL 0,0000 0,4542 
TARG_LEV 1,3210 0,0547c TARG_LEV 1,2509 0,5662 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0101 0,0457b OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0193 0,3102 
ACQ_Q 0,0292 0,4495 ACQ_Q 0,0054 0,9703 
ASYMMETRY1 -0,5641 0,0001a ASYMMETRY1 -0,2361 0,5068 
Cut(1) -0,0624 0,7118 Cash vs. Shares  
Cut(2) 1,0000 0,0000a Constant 1,3898 0,0000a 
  TRANS_VAL -0,0001 0,0812c 
   TARG_LEV 1,9682 0,0347b 
   OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0192 0,0075a 
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   ACQ_Q 0,0290 0,5985 
   ASYMMETRY1 -0,7349 0,0002a 
N=221  
Log Likelihood=-178.68 
  N =221  
Log likelihood=-176,13 
 
Table 11 - Determinants of ordinal choices between cash, hybrid and shares payments 
(Ordered values: Cash(2), Hybrid(1), Shares(0); ordered Logit and multinomial Logit 
estimates; cut are estimated limits between classes; multinomial estimates of cash vs. hybrid 
alternate choice and cash vs. shares choice; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for 
heteroscedasticity; variables definition: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; 
a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
 
The above Logit and Probit models do not see the means of payment as a continuum but see 3 
ordered classes. We now turn to the percentage of cash as dependant variable covering the 
continuum from 0 to 100% data. Using Tobit analysis may appear to take into account the 
truncated nature or the percentage of cash payment. The truncation applies if the independent 
variable observations are truncated for any reasons versus their real underlying values. It is 
not the case here where the observations are not truncated compared with the underlying 
phenomenon which is a percentage. Using a Tobit model as in Faccio and Masualis (2005) 
may explain because the limit observations of the independent variable, i.e. 0% and 100%, are 
overrepresented in their sample. This is also the case in our sample where hybrid deals 
comprise only 14% of the total. The Tobit analysis of the global sample is not conclusive and 
the algorithm does not converge with 18 regressors (see Table 12). The significance analysis 
of the individual variables may be biased. We used a simple linear regression of the 
PERC_CASH variable to compare with. The results are similar to the Tobit’s ones. The 
percentage of cash in payment is increasing with the offer premium. It is decreasing with the 
absolute size of the transaction, with the same economic sector dummy, with domestic 
transactions, with the leverage ratio of the target, with the subsidiary dummy. The control 
features are not explicitly addressed in the regressor’s list because of the colinearity between 
ASYMMETRY1 and PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU. We also used a modified regressors’ list 
including the percentage of the acquirer’s capital issued to pay the deal and a dummy for 
controlling family presence at the target’s level. If the initiator’s shareholders fear dilution or 
loose of control, they will be prone to pay more in cash if there is an important blockholder in 
the target’s capital who may become an important blockholder in the newly merged company. 
The same is expected: if the percentage of shares newly issued is sensitive, acquirers will pay 
more in cash. The first variable has a null estimated coefficient, with a t-value equal to zero. It 
is not significant. The percentage of issued shares is strongly negative. It underlines a 
mechanical positive relationship between the size of issued share and the percentage of 
 28
payment using shares. If the control has been threatened at the initiator’s level, we would have 
got a positive relationship with shareholders curbing the amount of new shares and privileging 
cash payment. This result is not in line with Faccio and Masulis (2005) where a positive 
relationship between control and percentage of cash payment is documented (however only 
for their sub sample of European firms and only at the 10% level). They conclude that 
maintenance of control will bend the percentage of cash. However, this rationale is only 
effective if the controlling structure is weak. If it is not the case, a negative relationship may 
appear, as in our sample. The Faccio and Masulis’ test on their global sample shows, as our’ s, 
a significant negative sign, which is coherent with the absence of threaten on the structure of 
control.  
 
INSERT TABLE 12 
 
 
-) Modelling alternative cash/share payment 
 
We used a restricted list of 8 explaining variables to explain the alternate full cash/full share 
payments. The asymmetry variable which fits the best is ASYMMETRY3. Both the Probit 
and the OLS estimates are convergent and confirm the previous results. Cash payment 
probability and percentage are negatively linked with the absolute transaction value, the same 
sector dummy, the domestic acquisition dummy and the asymmetry of information. They are 
positively explained by the acquirer’s relative cash flow and the offer premium. The 
percentage of share payment increases when the target and the acquirer are in the same sector. 
This is consistent with the cash availability explanation and the financial limitation theory 
(Martin, 1996). This is also consistent with the risk diversification analysis: when the merger 
does not develop in a context of economics diversification, the buyer is more prone to reduce 
his risk by paying with shares. The asymmetry of information favors share payments. Cash 
payments are less probable with large sized transactions. The contractual approach of M&A 
terms is supported with a significant link between cash payment and offer premium. We run a 
restricted Tobit model of the share/cash payment. The Tobit estimates are not convergent and 
we cannot statute on significancy. The asymmetry of information seems to go along with 
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share payment. A Logit model fits better and will get the same results as the Probit one, 
except for the asymmetry variable5. 
 
INSERT 13 
 
The results between the two estimates according the samples of firms in tables 12 and 13 
suggest that the nature of the determinants of the payment changes, particularly if we consider 
alternate “corner” choices, i.e. full cash or full equity payments. We also used a linear 
probability model instead of a Probit. The linear estimate function of the binary choice is 
shown in table 13. The fitted values of the Probit model and of the linear model of the dummy 
alternate choice between full cash and full share payments, are estimated. We calculated their 
respective cumulative density function. The correlation between the two is fairly good 
(+0.67)6. It means that, although imperfect, a linear estimate of the binary choice is a good 
proxy for the Probit model7. Therefore using a linear fitted value to explain the binary choice 
is acceptable and allow us to use a system of two linear equations (instead of a non linear 
system of equation). 
 
 
-) Hybrid payment choice and regimes of payments 
 
Some determinants are specific to given means of payments. An estimate of the genuine 
explaining variable of the cash percentage in hybrid payments is done using a limited set of 8 
variables because of the limited number of mixed payment transactions in our sub sample. It 
highlights that the percentage paid in cash is negatively linked with the offer premium. Other 
variables do not seem to influence it (see Table 14)8.  
 
Hybrid choice  
Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant 51,0912 0,0000a 
SAME_SECT -4,4922 0,6156 
                                                 
5
 Not reported here. 
6
 The mean values of the two fitted cdf values using Probit and linear estimates are respectively 0,855 vs. 0,783; 
they have the same standard deviation (0,149). 
7
 OLS regression on dummies may not respect the normality condition for residuals. We checked the normality 
of residual s. The skewness test and the Bera-Jarque test confirm normality at the 1% level. However Kurtosis 
confirms normality only at the 10% level. We introduced here a linear model for the alternative cash/shares 
choice because it will simplify the estimate of our two equations system below. 
8
 Considering the simple correlation values. 
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OFFER_PREMIUM_1W -0,3073 0,0249b 
TOEHOLD 0,0437 0,8300 
ACQ_Q -2,0908 0,1970 
TARG_Q 4,8004 0,2109 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 2,8683 0,7878 
DESEQ -1,4388 0,3140 
ASYMMETRY1 3,6990 0,2869 
Table 14 - Determinants of hybrid payment choices 
(Dependant: percentage paid in cash in hybrid transactions; OLS estimates; robust covariance 
estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; variables definition: see Table 8; European M&A 
transactions; 2000-2010; N=32; a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance 
level)  
 
The cash-share alternative shows explaining variables different from the hybrid payment 
setting. The significant constant means that, on the average, a 51/49 mixed payment scheme is 
considered. Then an important offer premium will reduce the percentage of cash payment, and 
for an average premium of 25%, it will result in a 43/57 percent scheme. The other variables 
are not significant, particularly the information asymmetry variable. A same sector acquisition 
will be done more frequently with a full-equity payment and not in an all-cash scheme. This 
diversification risk sharing effect determines a corner solution with either full cash or full 
share payments and has no impact on the choice of hybrid schemes. A competitive bid favors 
cash in full payment choice but not in mixed. When looking at simple correlation, the same is 
true for a domestic acquisition. Transaction value impacts negatively a full-cash payment. 
This transaction value is not significant in hybrid payments (when analyzing simple 
correlations or the cash/hybrid Probit in table 10).  
 
The conclusion we draw from the first step of the analysis is that the means of payment choice 
is a decision that follows different regimes (Carleton et al. 1983). In given contexts, some 
determinants are important to justify full cash or share payments. The previous empirics 
suggest that for instance cross country acquisitions and challenged deals are all or nothing 
conditions which trigger a full-cash payment. Another effect is less important. Full equity 
payments are linked with the offer premium. Sellers are paid less in price but more in hopes 
by accepting shares on the newly merged firms. Asymmetry of information and risk sharing 
goal will explain equity payments. These two regimes of payment are « corner solutions ». 
Hybrid payment introduces a continuum between the last two. They develop a complex 
scheme with a fine tuning of the many equilibrium variables shared in the agreement. The two 
most important are the price and the relative mix of payment. Hence this variable is 
endogenous and should be modelized specifically.  
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In the previous tests, cash payment and offer premiums are endogenous. These decisions are 
coincidental in a contractual approach. They cannot be separated when analyzing M&A 
transactions. This point is not systematically mentioned in the literature, except Faccio and 
Masulis (2005). It is more scarcely implemented in empirical test. It implies that the 
conclusion we derived in the first step of the analysis are questionable and they should be 
confirmed in a larger model of the transactions characteristics. 
 
3.3 Offer premium 
 
The offer premium is the well known term describing M&A deals. Its determinants are 
explored in table 15. We used a first set of 22 regressors including a constant and dummies 
for means of payment. The latter are not significant. The premium is increasing with the 
percentage of share acquired by the bidder. Challenged targets are paid more. We reduced the 
list of regressors to alternatives subsets of 10 or 6 variables, without any constant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 15 
 
The size of the offer premium is still increasing with the percentage of share acquired and 
when the deal is challenged. The percentage of cash payment is significant, meaning that 
higher cash payments lead to higher premiums. The contractual nature of a transaction 
appears with asymmetry of information: a large bidder relatively to the target will pay a lower 
premium. He can enjoy information superiority and influence the target to accept a lower 
premium. The target’s Q is positively linked with the premium. Opportunity growth at the 
target level enhances the paid premium. The negative EU zone dummy means that intra 
European firms will pay less. It evidences the empirical fact that cross border (i.e. outside 
Europe initiators) acquisition will pay higher premiums. The absolute size of the transaction 
does not influence significantly the premium.  
 
The DESEQ variable is the difference between the percentage of shares sought by the 
acquirer and the effective number of acquired shares. It is a proxy of disequilibrium in the 
transaction between the terms offered by the bidder and the strength of the agreement by the 
seller. For instance, tight conditions will result in a high value of DESEQ. The negative sign 
associated with that variable shows a link with relatively low (and insufficient) premiums. We 
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will use thereafter the linear equations to model the offer premium either in a large definition 
with 10 independent variables (equation Premium) or a restricted list of 6 variables (equation 
Premium1). 
 
 
3.4 Simultaneous equations 
 
As far as premiums and means of payment are jointly set we have to use simultaneous 
equations (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Officer, 2003). We distinguish two models to asses the 
regimes of payment. In each situation there is an endogenous link between the terms of the 
transactions. We first tested a unique system for the global cash/mixed/shares sample. It will 
be used as a benchmark before specific regimes system estimates. We acknowledge that it 
ignores the existence of two regimes in the mean of payment choice. We first check a large 
system version: 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1 + a7*TRANS_VAL + 
a8*SAME_SECT + a9*DUM_EU_ZONE + a10*DUM_SUBSIDIARY   (1a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*TRANS_VAL + b2*SAME_SECT + b3*DOMESTIC_ACQ + 
b4*ACQ_PC_EBITDA + b5*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b6*TOEHOLD + b7*TARG_LEV + 
b8*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + b9*DUM_SUBSIDIARY + b10*ASYMMETRY1 (1b) 
 
A reduced version is also tested with a more limited number of regressors: 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1   (2a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*TRANS_VAL + b2*ACQ_PC_EBITDA + b3*TARG_LEV + 
b4*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b5*ASYMMETRY1 + b6*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + 
b7*TOEHOLD          (2b) 
 
In each equation of the system, the dependent variable of one equation is an independent 
variable of the other. The results are displayed in table 16. A positive relationship between the 
cash percentage and the offer premium is significantly evidenced in the four equations. The 
offer premium is positively linked with the percentage of shares acquired, the target’ Q and 
the competitive nature of the deal and negatively with the disequilibrium. This confirms the 
univariate premiums estimate. The percentage of cash from 0% to 100%, including the two 
border limits, is positively influenced by TRANS_VAL, TARG_LEV, TOEHOLD and the 
 33
dummy DOMESTIC_ACQ. This is in line with what was expected. However the information 
asymmetry variable is nowhere significant, contrarily to expectations. 
  
 
INSERT TABLE 16 
 
We turn to systems of equations based on different regimes of means of payment. We still 
have as dependant variables in each couple of equations, the offer premium and the 
percentage of payment. In the cash/shares regime, the dependant is a dummy for either full 
cash(1) or full share(0) payments, in the mixed payment regime the dependant variable is the 
percentage paid in cash. 
 
-Cash/shares system of equations 
 
The first system of simultaneous equations has a binary choice as endogenous variable for 
payment. It is a dummy variable representing the percentage of cash payment for full cash 
(i.e. 100%) and full equity (0%). Here the sample is limited to full cash or full share 
transactions. The difficulty is that premium is a continuous variable and the cash payment is a 
discontinuous variable. As mentioned by Officer (2003) we cannot use a direct standard linear 
approach in such a situation. We substitute the mean of payment equation using a linear 
continuous proxy identified in Table 13. The probability to have full cash or full share 
payment is fitted by a linear form instead of a Probit equation9. We estimate systems of linear 
equations. 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1 + a7*TRANS_VAL + 
a8*SAME_SECT + a9*DUM_EU_ZONE + a10*DUM_SUBSIDIARY   (3a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*TRANS_VAL + b2*SAME_SECT + b3*DOMESTIC_ACQ + 
b4*ACQ_PC_EBITDA + b5*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b6*TARG_LEV + 
b7*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + b8 *ASYMMETRY3     (3b) 
 
                                                 
9
 A non linear Probit model would have been better. However it has a non linear form and lead to a non linear 
equations system. We tried to implement it and we get poor results. Our non linear system of equation 
econometric algorithms estimates coefficient assuming non zero second order derivatives. This is not the case 
with a Probit equation. So the standard deviations of estimates are not relevant and we cannot asses the 
significance of the estimated coefficients. 
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Equation (3a) is similar to equation (1a). A more limited system is also estimated with 6 
explaining variables for the offer premium instead of 10. 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1   (4a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*TRANS_VAL + b2*SAME_SECT + b3*DOMESTIC_ACQ + 
b4*ACQ_PC_EBITDA + b5*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b6*TARG_LEV + 
b7*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + b8 *ASYMMETRY3     (4b) 
 
The estimates of the linear systems (3a-b) and (4a-b) are shown in table 18. A strong and 
positive relation is identified between the offer premium and the dummy cash/share. The 
percentage of acquired shares and the target’s Q are increasing with the premium. The 
disequilibrium variable is negatively significant. The same is true for the dummy 
EURO_ZONE which means that acquirer’s incorporated in the EU will pay a lower premium 
than overseas acquirers. The determinants of the cash/share payment alternative are those 
previously identified (absolute size of transaction, sector diversification, dummy for domestic 
deals). What is new compared with the global sample test is now that the information 
asymmetry variable is strongly significant as expected by the risk sharing theory: The shares 
payment probability increases with the ASYMMETRY3 variable. 
 
INSERT TABLE 17 
 
The simultaneous equation test yields a more sophisticated view than a simple equation 
setting. The latter explains a dependant variable assuming no endogeneity in the regressors. 
Here a joint setting exists between the premium and the mode of payment (either all cash or 
all shares). The cross relation is positive and significant: premiums are higher with cash 
payments. Full cash offer will pay premium increased by 20% compared with shares payment. 
Compared to the single equation test, the difference is that the challenged characteristic of the 
deal is no more significant in explaining the premium. Intra EU transaction deals will have 
premiums with a 9% discount compared to cross border deals. Elements of the financial 
structure of the bidder (cash-flows and debt) have no influence on the premium paid. The 
financing decision is not relevant to infer the mean of payment choice (similarly to Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2009). The cash/share payment is a regime imposed by cross countries 
acquisitions, by the economic nature of the acquisition: same sector bids are more largely paid 
by shares. The absence of economic diversification will result in more risky synergies or 
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gains. It pushes the acquirer to cover this economic risk by paying more with shares. At the 
end, asymmetries of information are the driving variable behind the joint choice of the 
premium paid and the means of payment choice. 
 
In a binary choice between alternate means of payment it is rather difficult to find a more 
finely tuned agreement. The bidder can only signal the future value through the premium 
paid. As a result the transaction recorded is agreed but may present some disequilibrium 
features. Here the DESEQ variable is negative and significant. It signals that some bidders 
would have desired to get more shares than they effectively got. The explanation for the 
imbalance is simple: they do not pay enough and the premium offered was too small. 
 
- Hybrid payment system  
 
The second system of equation has the percentage of cash payment as dependant variable. It is 
estimated only on the sample of hybrid payment transactions. The major drawback of the 
estimation is the low number of available observations (N=32). We have two systems of 
equations according to the number of independent variables used in the offer premium 
equation: 10 or 6. 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1 + a7*TRANS_VAL + 
a8*SAME_SECT + a9*DUM_EU_ZONE + a10*DUM_SUBSIDIARY   (5a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*SAME_SECT + b2*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b3*TOEHOLD + 
b4*ACQ_Q + b5*TARG_Q + b6*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + b7*DESEQ + 
b8*ASYMMETRY1          (5b) 
 
 
Equation (5a) for offer premium is similar to equation (3a). A more limited system is also 
estimated: 
 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a1*PERC_SH_ACQD + a2*PERC_CASH + a3*DESEQ + 
a4*TARG_Q+ a5*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a6*ASYMMETRY1   (6a) 
 
PERC_CASH = b0 + b1*TRANS_VAL + b2*SAME_SECT + b3*DOMESTIC_ACQ + 
b4*ACQ_PC_EBITDA + b5*OFFER_PREMIUM_1W + b6*TARG_LEV + 
b7*DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + b8 *ASYMMETRY1     (6b) 
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These linear systems estimates are shown in table 18. We do not identify a positive cross 
relationship between the offer premium and the percentage paid in cash in mixed payment 
schemes. The offer premiums are positively influenced by the size of the block of acquired 
shares, by the challenging status of the deal and by the target’s Q value. The latter underlines 
the importance of growth opportunities at the target’s level. A new variable appears positively 
linked with the premium in hybrid payments: the absolute size of the transaction (only at the 
10% level). This determinant is not found significant in the full cash/full share transactions. 
The percentage of cash in the payment does not depend significantly on any variables. The 
result of our estimate on the hybrid sample is poor. The low number of observations and the 
large number of independent variable reduces the probability of a variable to appear as 
significant. Particularly the asymmetry of information is not found significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE 18 
 
We tried to limit the number of variable to increase the number of degree of freedom. In the 
panel C of table 18 we reduced the number of regressors. The sample is now 51 observations. 
We then get an offer premium positively correlated with PERC_SH_ACQ, TARG_Q and 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA. The percentage of cash is now positively linked with the offer 
premium, highlighting a contractual trade-off. The economic diversification also influences 
the deal in line with the contractual approach. The sign of the acquirer’s cash flow variable 
shows that the financial situation of the acquirers also conditions the setting of the mix of 
payment in the expected way. However, when looking at panel C the quality of the cash 
percentage equation remains very poor.10  
. 
How to interpret the absence of significant relationship in the case of hybrid M&A? We 
already mentioned the small size of the hybrid sample. Moreover, the simultaneous equation 
system underlines a complex equilibrium where many variables are endogenous. The one 
equation test of the cash percentage evidenced negative (non significant) relationship with the 
asymmetry of information (see table 12; also not significant in the global sample test, see 
table 16). The sign of the variable turns positive and remains not significant in the hybrid 
system of equations. It stays negative and becomes highly significant to explain the choice of 
payment in the alternative cash/share sample (See table 18). We conjecture that the 
                                                 
10
 If we introduce a constant in the cash percentage equation, the independent variables turn insignificant in panel 
C.  
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asymmetry of information is lower in hybrid payment schemes because of delivered 
information through the judicious setting of the percentage paid in cash as suggested in La 
Bruslerie (2010). The sample is a cross section of successful acquisitions with conditions 
apparently satisfying for the parties. An imbalanced situation where the bidder does not get 
what he wants does not appear significant and does not evidence poor premium setting. This 
is a strong difference with the test for alternative cash/share payments. 
 
The hybrid payment allows a fine tuning where the characteristics of the transaction are more 
inflated with information. Even if a negotiation does not exist formally in a takeover bid, 
when using a mixed scheme of payment the bidder should integrate not only his interest but 
also the seller’s ones. He knows that the percentage of cash is screened by the seller. We draw 
the conclusion that the transaction terms, particularly the percentage paid in cash, reflect 
equilibrium in risk sharing about the future uncertain value of the acquisition.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done 
separately. We show that these two variables are jointly set up in a contractual approach. 
More precisely the relationship of cash means of payment with the offer premium is positive: 
higher premiums will yield mixed payment with larger cash. A trade-off equilibrium 
develops: when the seller wants to be paid more, he should accept to be paid more in hope 
(i.e. in new equity shares). The risk sharing nature of a M&A deal is confirmed and influences 
the means of payment. The double risk situation relies on a double asymmetry of information 
between the buyer and the seller as identified by Hansen (1987). The choice of means of 
payment is a complex decision which can be done in alternate terms of full cash or full share 
payments. Hybrid payments follow a different rationale. The fine tuning of the percentage 
paid in cash is also an important term in a successful transaction and helps in delivering 
information.  
 
Considering a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, the determinants of the 
mean of payment choice are known and confirmed. Firms with a high growth potential and a 
high stock value may be more prone to finance acquisition with equity. Financial conditions 
are poorly significant as in Martynova and Renneboog (2009). As a result we show that 
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empirical analysis should not be done on global sample mixing any regime of payment. Full 
cash and full share payments are corner solutions which will yield different levels of 
equilibrium between parties. The determinants of the transaction terms are not the same and 
we identified two regimes of payment. Blending all the deals in one sample will assume that a 
continuum exists from full cash to all shares payments. Running regressions even through a 
simultaneous setting on a global sample can be misleading. It will ignore the difference of 
regimes of payments and the results may be spurious. The existence of regimes of payment in 
M&A transactions is the first conclusion. We tested the different sets of determinants of 
M&A terms in a contractual approach where the offer premium and the means of payment are 
jointly set. The underlying rationale of asymmetry of information and risk sharing calculus 
explains the contractual approach. It is supported by the data. It combines well with know 
factors such as cross border acquisitions, competitive transaction or the absolute size of the 
target, all of them favoring cash payment. However, the limited number of hybrid deals in our 
sample would justify further development. 
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Series Obs Mean Std.Err Minimum Maximum 
ACQ_CASH_HLDG 417 4268,3931 47547,7185 0,0060 966677,8710 
ACQ_EBITDA 422 4361,2206 35518,5197 -686,9000 707896,9590 
ACQ_LEV 413 0,2755 1,7507 -7,2377 31,6685 
ACQ_MKT_VAL_4W 306 16992,8120 35820,3673 7,3350 446828,4730 
ACQ_NET_ASS 424 18910,2834 202762,2048 -1021,5450 4104939,1990 
ACQ_NET_DEBT 423 3555,8100 57384,7745 -959364,8320 597080,3370 
ACQ_PC_CASH 417 11,8988 73,8880 0,0001 1015,2740 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA 422 14,3714 128,3267 -8,0298 2460,0518 
ACQ_PC_PPE 412 0,5799 3,1177 -22,5154 15,3450 
ACQ_PPE 423 12954,4591 100989,2728 0,2520 1911625,9020 
ACQ_Q 275 3,6032 5,0729 -8,2937 43,8388 
ASYMMETRY1 410 0,6592 1,2935 -0,3266 10,3594 
ASYMMETRY2 296 0,4530 0,7103 0,0009 4,3558 
ASYMMETRY3 413 0,9617 2,8396 -10,5519 31,0473 
ASYMMETRY4 268 2,5601 8,7223 -0,0083 99,6373 
DESEQ 479 1,8823 7,3729 -51,7620 65,4400 
DOMESTIC_ACQ 528 0,6042 0,4895 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_CASH 528 0,5568 0,4972 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 528 0,0606 0,2388 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_EU_ZONE 528 0,6439 0,4793 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_HYBRID 528 0,1174 0,3222 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_SH 528 0,1439 0,3514 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY 528 0,1913 0,3937 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_TARG_FAM_OWN 528 0,0019 0,0435 0,0000 1,0000 
DUM_TOE 528 0,3011 0,4592 0,0000 1,0000 
EBIT_ROA 418 0,0914 0,0871 0,0020 1,0070 
ENT_VAL 503 7745,4877 25648,6558 13,0360 442807,6090 
EQ_VAL 504 6432,4035 23458,5490 52,0780 432124,5420 
FRIEN_ATTITUD 528 0,6742 0,4691 0,0000 1,0000 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 423 28,7704 40,9218 -99,2400 340,4400 
PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU 528 6,2662 14,8454 0,0000 96,9700 
PERC_CASH 417 92,4949 20,1322 1,2390 100,0000 
PERC_OWN_AFTER 487 73,1246 36,3815 0,2990 100,0000 
PERC_SH 141 80,6033 26,9872 13,0800 100,0000 
PERC_SH_ACQD 483 58,0259 39,7593 0,2620 100,0000 
PERC_SOUGHT 500 61,1850 39,7712 0,2940 100,0000 
SAME_SECT 528 0,5814 0,4938 0,0000 1,0000 
TARG_LEV 491 0,0946 0,2311 -0,8834 0,6701 
TARG_LEV1 427 0,2649 0,2028 0,0010 0,8950 
TARG_MKT_VAL 521 3953,4782 10549,1174 -42,7050 113064,3820 
TARG_NET_ASS 520 2332,6581 6395,0014 -5520,8350 91946,0490 
TARG_PC_CASH 513 1,2113 6,0299 0,0001 93,9707 
TARG_Q 485 3,2921 4,2978 0,3750 34,6180 
TARG_Q1 478 4,8783 5,9806 0,4460 46,3910 
TOEHOLD 528 14,1002 26,9098 0,0000 99,4570 
TRANS_VAL 528 1804,0272 6586,9736 50,2420 75960,8470 
Annex 1 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
(after filtering variables; observations above the 99% and below the 1% distribution 
eliminated for the ASSYMMETRY, TARG_Q, ACQ_G, ACQ_LEV and TARG_LEV 
variables, variable definitions, see table 8) 
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 ASYMMETRY1 ASYMMETRY2 ASYMMETRY3 ASYMMETRY4 ACQ_LEV TARG_LEV TARG_LEV1 TARG_Q1 TARG_Q ACQ_Q 
ASYMMETRY1 1,0000          
ASYMMETRY2 0,6402 1,0000         
ASYMMETRY3 0,5914 0,2455 1,0000        
ASYMMETRY4 -0,0918 0,0075 -0,0750 1,0000       
ACQ_LEV 0,0620 0,0207 -0,2532 -0,0171 1,0000      
TARG_LEV 0,1963 0,3240 0,0080 -0,0803 0,0307 1,0000     
TARG_LEV1 0,2494 0,3644 0,0298 -0,0524 0,0745 0,5942 1,0000    
TARG_Q1 -0,0815 -0,0862 0,0598 -0,0077 0,0189 0,0452 0,2777 1,0000   
TARG_Q -0,1014 -0,1790 0,1433 0,0266 0,0191 -0,2035 -0,1113 0,6944 1,0000  
ACQ_Q 0,2064 -0,1218 0,3245 -0,1419 0,0715 -0,0958 -0,0966 0,1413 0,2906 1,0000 
ACQ_PC_PPE 0,0142 -0,0550 -0,0981 -0,0031 0,3835 -0,0217 0,0052 -0,0493 -0,0714 0,0327 
Annex 2 Correlation matrix between asymmetry of information, leverage and Tobin’s Q variables 
(ASSYMETRY1: Ratio of target and acquirer’s net assets using accounting value; ASYMMETRY2: ratio o target market value divided by the 
acquirer market value 4 weeks before transaction; ASYMMETRY3: Ratio of the transaction value divided by the acquirer’s accounting total 
value; ASYMMETRY4: Ratio of the target’s Q value  divided by the acquirer’s Q; ACQ_LEV: Ratio of the acquirer’s net debt to the sum of his 
net book value and his net debt; TARG_LEV: One minus the equity book value divide by the enterprise total value; TARG_LEV1 Target long 
term debt divided by long term debt plus equity using accounting values; TARG_Q1: Ratio of Enterprise Value to Net Assets; TARG_Q:. Ratio 
of Enterprise Value to Target Capitalization; ACQ_Q: Acquirer’s market value 4 week before transaction divide by his net asset value; 
ACQ_PC_PPE: Ratio of acquirer’s net debt compared to his book value of properties, plant and equipments) 
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Hybrid (vs Shares)  Cash(vs Hybrid)  Cash(vs shares)  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant -22,2048 0,0800c Constant 2,8109 0,0882c Constant 5,6542 0,0001a 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,1946 0,1105 PERC_SH_ACQD -0,1394 0,0949c PERC_SH_ACQD 0,0139 0,7239 
TRANS_VAL -0,0001 0,3734 TRANS_VAL 0,0000 0,3166 TRANS_VAL -0,0001 0,0502c 
SAME_SECT -0,1866 0,7943 SAME_SECT -0,2052 0,5513 SAME_SECT -1,3944 0,0012b 
DOMESTIC_ACQ -1,4828 0,3293 DOMESTIC_ACQ -0,8200 0,0317 DOMESTIC_ACQ -1,9726 0,0003a 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,8945 0,4544 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,3827 0,0490b ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0789 0,3920 
TARG_PC_CASH -3,1509 0,2592 TARG_PC_CASH 0,7372 0,6882 TARG_PC_CASH -0,0108 0,7447 
FRIEN_ATTITUD 1,8546 0,1231 FRIEN_ATTITUD 0,6267 0,2897 FRIEN_ATTITUD 1,0383 0,0765c 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0556 0,0255b OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0102 0,1122 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0328 0,0003a 
DUM_TOE 13,0029 0,0896c DUM_TOE -0,3448 0,6447 DUM_TOE 0,0990 0,8498 
EBIT_ROA -2,7898 0,5621 EBIT_ROA -0,5510 0,9076 EBIT_ROA -3,8303 0,1185 
ACQ_LEV 1,8367 0,0277b ACQ_LEV -0,0018 0,9902 ACQ_LEV -0,1373 0,5536 
TARG_LEV -9,6022 0,0067a TARG_LEV 0,6923 0,5723 TARG_LEV -4,8995 0,0036a 
ACQ_Q -0,1631 0,3295 ACQ_Q 0,0748 0,1580 ACQ_Q -0,1164 0,0377b 
TARG_Q -0,5685 0,0119b TARG_Q 0,3353 0,0557c TARG_Q -0,1802 0,0087a 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 17,2773 0,0079a DUM_CHALLGED_DEA -0,5239 0,2823 DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 7,7897 0,0001a 
PERC_SOUGHT 0,0521 0,4737 PERC_SOUGHT 0,0997 0,2040 PERC_SOUGHT -0,0352 0,3689 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY 3,5970 0,0137b DUM_SUBSIDIARY -0,5314 0,4415 DUM_SUBSIDIARY 0,1833 0,8201 
ASYMMETRY1 -0,0859 0,7589 ASYMMETRY1 -0,2211 0,2821 ASYMMETRY1 -0,2415 0,2537 
N=50   N=138   N=132   
Table 10 Determinants of alternate choice of a mean of payment 
(Probability to choose one mean of payment against another specified one, Probit estimates; Cash: full cash payment; Hybrid: mixed payment; Shares: full 
share payment; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; variable definitions: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; 
a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
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Tobit Perc_Cash   Lin. Reg Perc_cash (1)   Lin. Reg Perc_cash (2) 
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant 1112,4972 0,0002 Constant 121,5378 0,0000a Constant 105,1491 0,0000a 
PERC_SH_ACQD -0,8416 0,8382 PERC_SH_ACQD -0,1319 0,7877 PERC_SH_ACQD -0,0944 0,8052 
TRANS_VAL -0,0078 0,0238 TRANS_VAL -0,0006 0,0039a TRANS_VAL -0,0001 0,5600 
SAME_SECT -216,8060 0,0032 SAME_SECT -12,0207 0,0275b SAME_SECT -0,4259 0,9108 
DOMESTIC_ACQ -295,4123 0,0009 DOMESTIC_ACQ -16,6918 0,0014a DOMESTIC_ACQ -2,6853 0,5001 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA 36,3822 0,0055 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,2157 0,5736 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,2475 0,3716 
TARG_PC_CASH 1,8202 0,8569 TARG_PC_CASH 0,1804 0,6256 TARG_PC_CASH 0,0157 0,9580 
FRIEN_ATTITUD 334,2448 0,0030 FRIEN_ATTITUD 8,2984 0,2270 FRIEN_ATTITUD 1,4876 0,7583 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 6,7687 0,0003 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,3057 0,0003a OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,2384 0,0023a 
DUM_TOE -26,4874 0,7463 DUM_TOE 0,6083 0,9301 DUM_TOE -4,7283 0,3725 
EBIT_ROA -521,0896 0,1655 EBIT_ROA -27,3563 0,6732 EBIT_ROA -16,4083 0,7939 
ACQ_LEV 52,1914 0,0840 ACQ_LEV 1,9466 0,4628 ACQ_LEV 0,5268 0,7726 
TARG_LEV -907,7025 0,0009 TARG_LEV -29,0440 0,0900c TARG_LEV -21,7329 0,1262 
ACQ_Q -17,8164 0,1215 ACQ_Q -0,3556 0,6074 ACQ_Q 0,3138 0,3912 
TARG_Q -33,7571 0,0019 TARG_Q -1,2279 0,4795 TARG_Q -1,2179 0,4190 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 136,7236 0,3332 DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 8,1201 0,2430 DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 2,5481 0,5772 
PERC_SOUGHT -6,8574 0,1222 PERC_SOUGHT -0,2698 0,5757 PERC_SOUGHT -0,0722 0,8491 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY -277,4035 0,0116 DUM_SUBSIDIARY -16,3013 0,0844c DUM_SUBSIDIARY -12,3523 0,0990c 
ASYMMETRY1 -37,3840 0,2434 ASYMMETRY1 -5,6066 0,0548c PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSU -1,5218 0,0000a 
SIGMA 66,540 0,0000   DUM_TARG_FAM_OWN 0,000 ns 
N=159   N=159  
R2adj:0,27 
  N=162  
R2:0,60 
  
Table 12 – Determinants of the percentage paid in cash 
(Dependant variable is the percentage paid in cash from 0 to 100%; Trobit truncated estimates not convergent, p-val are not reliable; Lin.Reg.: OLS 
Linear estimates; ns: p-val is not significant; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; variable definitions: see Table 8; European 
M&A transactions; 2000-2010; a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
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Restricted cash/share alternative Probit  Dummy cash/shares Linear OLS estimate 
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant 0,8768 0,0001a Constant 0,8946 0,0000a 
TRANS_VAL -0,00003 0,0051a TRANS_VAL -0,00001 0,0000a 
SAME_SECT -0,5050 0,0138b SAME_SECT -0,0890 0,0427b 
DOMESTIC_ACQ -0,5947 0,0042a DOMESTIC_ACQ -0,1314 0,0037a 
ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,1661 0,0003a ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0001 0,0284b 
OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0113 0,0030a OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,0012 0,0206b 
TARG_LEV 0,9332 0,0430b TARG_LEV 0,1169 0,2902 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 1,2746 0,0077a DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 0,1684 0,0008a 
ASYMMETRY3 -0,0560 0,0802c ASYMMETRY3 -0,0221 0,0629c 
N=283  
Log=-102,99 
  N=283  
R2=0,14 
  
Table 13 – Determinants of alternative cash-shares choice 
(Dependant is dummy full cash(1)/full share(0) payment; restricted model with 8 variables; Probit estimates; robust covariance estimate are used to 
adjust for heteroscedasticity; variable definitions: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 
10% significance level) 
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Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
Constant -0,7471 0,9558 PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2632 0,0000a PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2134 0,0000a 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2812 0,0027a PERC_CA1 0,1761 0,0000a PERC_CA1 0,1590 0,0000a 
TRANS_VAL -0,0002 0,1283 DESEQ -0,3941 0,1184 DESEQ -0,4447 0,0105b 
SAME_SECT 2,9794 0,4617 TARG_Q 1,3944 0,0017a TARG_Q 1,1784 0,1120 
DOMESTIC_ACQ -3,9001 0,3742 DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 17,0925 0,0214b DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 17,5179 0,0022a 
DUM_EU_ZONE -9,7539 0,1453 ASYMMETRY1 -0,6691 0,6957 ASYMMETRY1 -1,9458 0,0344b 
ACQ_PC_CASH -0,2524 0,3435 TRANS_VAL -0,0003 0,2531   
ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0049 0,9920 SAME_SECT 0,0623 0,9870    
TARG_PC_CASH 0,6611 0,0694c DUM_EU_ZONE -8,4132 0,0562c    
FRIEN_ATTITUD -7,4393 0,1904 DUM_SUBSIDIARY 2,5055 0,6379    
PERC_CA1 0,1485 0,4745      
DUM_TOE -3,5457 0,5552       
DESEQ -0,3440 0,1468       
EBIT_ROA -44,4597 0,2285       
ACQ_LEV 0,2357 0,9036       
TARG_LEV 9,7053 0,4958       
ACQ_Q 0,4360 0,4465       
TARG_Q 1,2156 0,0580c       
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 13,0422 0,0628c       
DUM_SUBSIDIARY -7,5133 0,2729       
DUM_CASH 10,6170 0,6223       
DUM_HYBRID 9,5223 0,3843       
ASYMMETRY1 0,6669 0,7093       
N=156   N=316   N=316   
R2=0,26   R2=0,15   R2=0,14   
Table 15 – Determinants of the offer premiums 
(Dependant is offer premium in percentage calculated 1 week before the announcement; OLS estimates; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust 
for heteroscedasticity; variable definitions: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; N=a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 
10% significance level) 
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Panel A      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2619 0,0000a Constant 79,5852 0,0000a 
PERC_CA1 0,1815 0,0000a TRANS_VAL -0,0008 0,0052a 
DESEQ -0,4306 0,0898c SAME_SECT -7,2093 0,1078 
TARG_Q 1,3516 0,0021a DOMESTIC_ACQ -16,9655 0,0003a 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 16,6398 0,0230b ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0058 0,7068 
ASYMMETRY1 -0,9062 0,5910 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,1069 0,0936c 
TRANS_VAL -0,0003 0,2283 TOEHOLD 0,1384 0,1609 
SAME_SECT -0,6179 0,8699 TARG_LEV 20,4954 0,0393b 
  DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 8,3900 0,3087 
   DUM_SUBSIDIARY -0,8896 0,8985 
   ASYMMETRY1 -0,3808 0,8443 
N=312   N=312  
R2=0,13   R2=0,09  
Panel B      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2157 0,0000 Constant 66,6328 0,0000a 
PERC_CA1 0,1663 0,0000 TRANS_VAL -0,0008 0,0059a 
DESEQ -0,4735 0,0591 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0086 0,5850 
TARG_Q 1,1480 0,0067 TARG_LEV 20,6861 0,0401b 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 17,0109 0,0190 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,1462 0,0228b 
ASYMMETRY1 -2,0558 0,1945 ASYMMETRY1 -1,6997 0,3790 
  DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 7,1585 0,3916 
   TOEHOLD 0,1439 0,0806c 
N=312 
R2=0,13 
  N=312  
R2 0,05 
 
Table 16 – Determinants of offer premiums and percentage for any means of payment - Simultaneous equation estimates over the global sample 
(Dependants are offer premiums in percentage calculated 1 week before the announcement and percentage paid in cash; linear system of two 
equations; see equations (1a-b) and (2a-b) in the text; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; variable definitions: see Table 
8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; N=a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
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Panel A      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2343 0,0000a Constant 87,3147 0,0000a 
PERC_CA1 0,2266 0,0000a TRANS_VAL -0,0008 0,0061a 
DESEQ -0,4139 0,1223 SAME_SECT -8,6669 0,0696c 
TARG_Q 1,2724 0,0162b DOMESTIC_ACQ -11,9831 0,0146b 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 10,8204 0,2199 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0080 0,5882 
ASYMMETRY1 -1,5695 0,4023 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,1564 0,0147b 
TRANS_VAL -0,0002 0,5213 TARG_LEV 9,8302 0,3541 
SAME_SECT -0,7300 0,8647 DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 14,6167 0,1070 
DUM_EU_ZONE -8,8572 0,0672c ASYMMETRY3 -2,0069 0,0100a 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY -0,3900 0,9474   
N=255   N=255   
R2=0,13   R2=0,11   
Panel B      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,1911 0,0001a Constant 87,3147 0,0000a 
PERC_CA1 0,1972 0,0000a TRANS_VAL -0,0008 0,0061a 
DESEQ -0,4794 0,0703a SAME_SECT -8,6669 0,0696c 
TARG_Q 0,9757 0,0550c DOMESTIC_ACQ -11,9831 0,0146b 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 12,4101 0,1564 ACQ_PC_EBITDA 0,0080 0,5882 
ASYMMETRY1 -2,8159 0,1117 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,1564 0,0147b 
  TARG_LEV 9,8302 0,3541 
   DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 14,6167 0,1070 
   ASYMMETRY3 -2,0069 0,0100a 
N=255   N=255   
R2=0,13   R2=0,12  
Table 17 – Determinants of offer premiums and percentage for full cash/full share payments - Simultaneous linear equation estimates  
(Dependants are offer premiums in percentage calculated 1 week before the announcement and percentage paid in cash(0% or 100%); linear 
system of two equations; see equations (1a-b) and (2a-b) in the text; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; variable 
definitions: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; N=a: 1% significance level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
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Panel A      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variables Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2311 0,0889c Constant 51,0912 0,0001a 
PERC_CA1 -0,3002 0,1437 SAME_SECT -4,4922 0,6334 
DESEQ -1,0003 0,6201 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W -0,3073 0,1526 
TARG_Q 4,0443 0,0993 TOEHOLD 0,0437 0,8916 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 33,6948 0,0146b ACQ_Q -2,0908 0,3555 
ASYMMETRY1 0,9525 0,8202 TARG_Q 4,8004 0,3162 
TRANS_VAL -0,0007 0,0928c DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 2,8683 0,8394 
SAME_SECT 4,1792 0,6494 DESEQ -1,4388 0,5094 
DUM_EU_ZONE 9,6868 0,4247 ASYMMETRY1 3,6990 0,5056 
DUM_SUBSIDIARY 2,7048 0,8521    
N=32   N=32   
R2=0,15   R2=ns   
Panel B      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W Dep PERC_CASH  
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2987 0,0068a Constant 51,0912 0,0001a 
PERC_CA1 -0,2390 0,1566 SAME_SECT -4,4922 0,6334 
DESEQ -0,2526 0,8806 OFFER_PREMIUM_1W -0,3073 0,1526 
TARG_Q 3,2981 0,1476 TOEHOLD 0,0437 0,8916 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 23,1298 0,0484b ACQ_Q -2,0908 0,3555 
ASYMMETRY1 1,4349 0,7006 TARG_Q 4,8004 0,3162 
  DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 2,8683 0,8394 
   DESEQ -1,4388 0,5094 
   ASYMMETRY1 3,6990 0,5056 
N=32   N=32   
R2=0,16   R2=ns   
Panel C      
Dep OFFER_PREMIUM_1W  Dep PERC_CASH   
Variable Coefficient p-val Variable Coefficient p-val 
PERC_SH_ACQD 0,2446 0,0001a OFFER_PREMIUM_1W 0,4695 0,0012a 
TARG_Q 3,3741 0,0198b SAME_SECT 23,7547 0,0026a 
TRANS_VAL -0,0006 0,1292 ACQ_EBITDA 0,0026 0,0279b 
DUM_CHALLGED_DEA 22,3073 0,0547c    
N=51    N=51    
R2=0,15   R2=ns   
Table 18 – Determinants of offer premiums and percentage for hybrid payments - 
Simultaneous linear equation estimates  
(Dependants are offer premiums in percentage calculated 1 week before the announcement 
and percentage paid in cash(0% or 100%); linear system of two equations; see equations (1a-
b) and (2a-b) in the text; robust covariance estimate are used to adjust for heteroscedasticity; 
variable definitions: see Table 8; European M&A transactions; 2000-2010; N=a: 1% significance 
level; b: 5% significance level; c: 10% significance level) 
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ANNEX 1 
 
Deal Value ($ Mil) Between 50 to HI 
Target Nation (Code) Include France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy 
Acquirer Nation Region 
(Code) 
Include Japan, Europe, North America 
Acquisition Techniques 
(Code) 
Include Mandatory Offering, Private Tender 
Offer, Merger of Equals, 
Tender/Merger, Tender Offer, 
Privately Negotiated Purchase, Open 
Market Purchase, Exchange Offer 
Target or Acquirer Macro 
Industry (Code) 
Exclude Financials, Government and Agencies 
Deal Status (Code) Include Completed, Unconditional 
Consideration Sought (Codes) Include Common Stock, Warrants, Stock, 
Convertible Bond, Ordinary Share 
Consideration Offered 
Category (Code) 
Include Cash, Common/Ordinary Shares 
Acquirer Public Status (Code) Include Public 
Target Public Status (Code) Include Public 
Annex 1 Criteria used to select takeover (dates of deals between 01/01//2000 and 01/05/2010; 
source: Thomson One Banker) 
 
 
 
 
